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I.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,

Petitioner,

BJ-Titan

Services

Company

("BJ-Titan") ,

respectfully petitions the Utah Supreme Court for a rehearing
with respect to the Court's decision, dated March 31, 1992, in
the above-referenced matter.
II.

BACKGROUND

BJ-Titan initiated an appeal, seeking review of the
Utah State Tax Commission's (the "Commission") decision, dated
July 2, 1990, that imposed a sales tax on BJ-Titan's oil and gas
well stimulation (cementing, fracturing and acidizing) services,
and on a transfer of motor vehicles from BJ-Hughes Holding Company to BJ-Titan.

By its decision dated March 31, 1992, this

Court affirmed the Commission's ruling that the cementing services provided by BJ-Titan are subject to sales taxation; however, the Court reversed the Commission's ruling that BJ-Titan's
fracturing and acidizing services are taxable, and remanded the
proceeding to the Commission, in part, to identify that portion
of the deficiency attributable to the acidizing and fracturing
services.

Finally, the Court affirmed the Commission's decision

that the transfer of motor vehicles from BJ-Hughes to BJ-Titan
was subject to sales taxation,
BJ-Titan petitions the Court for a rehearing solely
with

respect

to

the

Court's

affirmance
-1-

of

the

Commission's

decision that BJ-Titan's cementing services are subject to sales
taxation,

BJ-Titan is not seeking a rehearing of the Court's

decision with respect to the acidizing and fracturing services,
nor is BJ-Titan seeking a review of the Court's decision with
respect to the imposition of a sales tax upon the transfer of
motor vehicles,
III.

ARGUMENT

The Court should have reversed the
Commission because the Commission
failed to apply the proper legal
standard in construing Utah Code Ann,
S 59-15-4 (1986).
Through

numerous

decisions

of

this

Court

over

the

years, it is well established that statutes which impose a tax
are to be construed

liberally

in favor of the taxpayer and

strictly against the taxing authority.

For example, in Utah Farm

Bureau Insurance Co. v. State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 421, 3 47
P.2d

179,

182

(1959),

the

Court

stated

that

it

is

a

"well-recognized rule that in case of ambiguity, uncertainty or
doubt, taxing statutes are construed liberally in favor of the
taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority."

The Utah

Farm Bureau Court cited with approval its prior statement in
Pacific Intermountain Express Company v. State Tax Commission, 8
Utah 2d 144, 329 P.2d 650, 651 (1958), "that taxing statutes are
to be construed strictly, and in favor of the taxpayer were
doubtful."

In support

of this
-2-

legal

standard

of

statutory

construction, the Pacific Intermountain Court cited to Gould v.
Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 38 S.Ct. 53, 62 L.Ed. 211, 213

(1917)

(emphasis added), wherein the United States Supreme Court stated:
In the interpretation of statutes levying
taxes it is the established rule not to
extend their provisions, by implication,
beyond the clear import of the language used,
or to enlarge their operation so as to
embrace matters not specifically pointed out.
In case of doubt they are construed more
strongly against the government and in favor
of the citizen^ (Citations omitted.)1
See also Merrill Bean Chevrolet. Inc. v. State Tax Commission,
549 P. 2d 443, 446 (1976) ("we have also held taxing statutes,
where doubtful, are to be construed strictly, and in favor of the
taxpayer."); Parsons Asphalt Products. Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 617 P. 2d 397, 398
should

generally

(1980) ("even though taxing statutes

be construed

favorable to the taxpayer and

strictly against the taxing authority . . . " ) .
As recent as this Court's decision in Chris & Dick's
Lumber & Hardware v. State Tax Commission. 791 P.2d 511, 517
(Utah 1990), Associate Chief Justice Howe, in his dissenting
opinion, reconfirms the existence of this legal standard and

1

The Court's decision in B.J.-Titan is inconsistent with this
rule because it permits the Commission to tax services (i.e., 70%
of what BJ-Titan sells to customers), thereby enlarging the scope
of Utah's sales tax statute, without specific statutory authorization.
The cementing services are more fully described in
BJ-Titan's brief. These services are not incidental to the sale
of tangible personal property.
-3-

notes the susceptibility to the omission of its application.
Justice Howe stated (emphasis added):
Another crucial rule of construction which
has been ignored by the majority is that taxing statutes are to be construed strictly and
in favor of the taxpayer when doubtful. Parson Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Commission, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980);
Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 8 Utah 2d 144, 146, 329 P.2d 650,
651 (1958).
BJ-Titan

files this

Petition

for Rehearing

because

(1) the Commission failed to apply the appropriate legal standard
in construing

the application

of a sales taxing

statute to

BJ-Titan's cementing services, and (2) this Court gave deference
to the Commission's decision even in light of the Commission's
failure to apply the correct legal standard.
This proceeding, in relevant part, concerns BJ-Titan's
appeal of the Commission's decision to impose a sales tax upon
BJ-Titan's

cementing

§ 59-15-4 (1986).

services

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Ann.

This statute does not establish an exemption

from taxation; instead, it imposes a tax.

This is a critical

distinction, a proper understanding of which is essential to the
correct resolution of the issue presented here.
As the Court's opinion in B.J. -Titan notes at the outset, the "basic facts [in this case] are undisputed."
at l.

Decision

Consequently, the sole issue is the construction of terms

in a statute which

imposes a tax on the sale of

-4-

"tangible

personal property."

By necessary implication, the statute does

not impose a sales tax on services, unless specifically stated
otherwise.

In sum, the case raises a single legal issue:

What

is the proper construction and application of a taxing statute to
undisputed facts?
BJ-Titan contests the application or imposition of a
taxing statute upon the cementing services it provides, not upon
the sale of concrete used in rendering those services.
is not seeking an exemption from sales taxation.

BJ-Titan

In cases deal-

ing with exemptions, a different legal standard of construction
applies, i.e., the statute is strictly construed against the taxpayer who has the burden of showing his right to the exemption.
Even though taxing statutes should generally
be construed favorably to the taxpayer and
strictly against the taxing authority, the
reverse is true of exemptions.
Statutes
which provide for exemptions should be
strictly construed, and one who so claims has
the burden of showing his entitlement to the
exemption.
Parson Asphalt Products at 398 (emphasis added).
Because BJ-Titan is contesting the application or imposition of a taxing statute to its cementing services, BJ-Titan is
entitled to have that statute construed liberally in its favor
and strictly against the Commission.

Correspondingly, because

BJ-Titan is not seeking an exemption, BJ-Titan does not have "the
burden of showing [its] entitlement" to relief.

-5-

This distinction

in application of burdens is at the crux of BJ-Titan's Petition
for Rehearing.
The Commission not only failed to apply the proper
legal standard (i.e., construing the application of a sales taxing statute liberally in favor of BJ-Titan, and strictly against
the taxing authority), but treated BJ-Titan as if it were seeking
an exemption

and

applied

the wrong

standard

of

construction

(i.e., strictly construing the statute and placing the burden on
BJ-Titan to "show [its] entitlement to the exemption."
Asphalt, supra).

Parsons

This fundamental error, which necessitates a

reconsideration by the Court, is clearly illustrated in the Commission's decision, wherein it stated:
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission
finds that Petitioners failed to establish by
a preponderance of evidence that its oil and
gas stimulation services are exempt from
sales and use tax.
Decision of Commission at 11 (emphasis added).

Based on this

incorrect legal standard, the Commission ruled against BJ-Titan,
holding that BJ-Titan was not entitled to an exemption from sales
tax since BJ-Titan had not carried its burden of showing its
entitlement to the exemption.

However, as discussed above, this

is the improper legal standard to apply to this issue.

Again,

BJ-Titan was not seeking an exemption from taxation, but was contesting the application or imposition of a taxing statute to its
cementing services.

Therefore, under the correct legal standard,

-6-

the Commission was required to liberally construe the statute in
favor of BJ-Titan and strictly against the taxing authority,
which the Commission clearly failed to do.
Had the correct

legal standard

been applied, which

requires the construction of taxing statutes in favor of the taxpayer, no tax should have been imposed where the factors weigh
both in favor and against taxation, as in this case.

In close

decisions, where there is doubt or uncertainty as to whether the
2
taxing statute should apply,

the taxing statute should be con-

strued to impose a sales tax only when there is "substantial"
evidence or factors dictating or compelling the imposition of a
tax.
Besides explicit language in the Commission's decision
3
.
..
applying the wrong legal test,

the Commission's decision to tax

services in what the Court found from undisputed facts to be a
"close case" further demonstrates that the Commission failed to
apply the correct legal standard of construction.

In its deci-

sion, this Court stated that it was a "close decision" (Decision
at 9) as to whether a sales tax should be imposed with respect to
2

See Utah Farm Bureau Insurance, supra. at 182 ("in case of
ambiguity, uncertainty or doubt, taxing statutes are construed
liberally in favor of the taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority") (emphasis added).
3

Nor is there any discussion or implication in the Commission's decision that it considered or applied the correct legal
standard.
-7-

BJ-Titan's cementing services.

The Court specifically listed

certain factors which militate both for and against taxation in
this case.

The Court also concluded that because the facts in

this case weigh both for and against taxation, it is not clear or
certain that a tax should be imposed.

This Court stated: "We

cannot say that these facts compel a conclusion that the cementing services rendered in this case are incidental to the product
delivered [and are thus taxable]."

Decision at 9.

facts did

to the contrary, the Court

not compel

a

finding

But since the

deferred to the Commission's decision, stating that it was not
..
arbitrary or unreasonable.4 Decision
at 9. However, when the
Commission fails to apply the proper legal standards of statutory
construction, its decisions are in error and invalid ab initio
and should not be given any deference.

Instead, the Commission's

decision should be corrected by applying the correct legal standard.

Given this Court's findings that the facts do not compel a

conclusion that the services are incidental, the taxing statute
must be construed in favor of BJ-Titan unless the Court finds the
facts weigh substantially in favor of taxation.

4

The Court's citation to Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc. v. State Tax
Commission, 805 P. 2d 176 (Utah 1990) and McKendrick v. State Tax
Commission, 3476 P.2d 177 (1959), in support of the rule that the
Commission's decision will not be overturned unless unreasonable,
are inapposite because, presumably, the Commission in those cases
applied the correct legal standard.
-8-

BJ-Titan's argument that a tie goes to the taxpayer,
not the Commission, and that there should be substantial evidence
or factors weighing in favor of taxation before the Commission is
upheld, is not a new principle.5 In Ralph Child Construction Co.
v. State Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 53, 362 P.2d 422, 424 (1961),
a sales and use tax case, this Court stated that there must be
"substantial evidence" before a taxing statute, which is required
to be construed in favor of the taxpayer, is imposed upon a taxpayer.

In support of that evidentiary rule, the Court cited

Pacific Intermountain Express Company, supra, which is the seminal case the Court has repeatedly cited for the principle that
taxing statutes are to be construed in favor of the taxpayer and
strictly against the taxing authority.

Based on that principle,

the Court stated that the State must procure "substantial evidence" before a taxing statute would apply.

5

BJ-Titan's brief points out that the Commission was attempting to interpret a taxing statute, as opposed to an exemption
statute, in concluding that the services BJ-Titan sells are subject to a sales. See Brief of Petitioner at 17. Unfortunately,
the Court's opinion appears to have overlooked this point and
does not mention or discuss the proper standard for reviewing
taxing statutes and exemption statutes. For example, the Court
did not cite Utah Farm Bureau, Pacific Intermountain, Merrill
Bean or Parson Asphalt. Although the Court cited Ralph Child
Construction, the case is cited in support of the "second theory,
known as the ultimate user or consumer." Decision at 5 and 8.
There is no discussion as to Ralph Child Constructions requirement that the Commission produce "substantial evidence" in imposing a taxing statute, discussed infra.
-9-

In Ralph Child Construction, the taxpayer ("Child Construction") was appealing the Commission's assessment of sales
and use taxes.

Child Construction had purchased certain utility

poles from Southam of Spanish Fork and set the utility poles in
the ground under a general contract with the Emery County Union
Telephone Association for the construction of a telephone system.
Neither Southam nor Child Construction reported the sale of utility poles to the Tax Commission and thus no sales tax had been
paid.
Under the relevant statute, if personal property was
sold "upon the representation" of a taxpayer that such property
was purchased for resale, the taxpayer would nonetheless incur
liability of the tax if the property was not, in fact, subsequently sold.

Hence, the Commission argued that Child Construc-

tion was purchasing the utility poles for resale rather than for
consumption, but then failed to sell the poles.

Southam had gone

out of business and thus the Commission could only look to Child
Construction to collect the sales tax.
While the Court upheld the assessment of tax against
Child Construction on other legal grounds, with respect to the
Commission's attempt to impose a tax under the resale statute,
the Court, citing Pacific Intermountain Express Company, supra,
stated that there must be "substantial evidence" before the statute would apply.

-10-

The state has the burden of producing substantial evidence which would reasonably justify a finding that Child made such a representation.
Pacific Intermountain Express
Company v, State Tax Commission, 8 Utah 2d
144, 329 P. 2d 6700 (citation in footnote 2)
(emphasis added).
The rule of liberal construction thiis embraces both the
facts and the law in cases where either or both are uncertain.
This rule was not followed here, either by the Tax Commission or
this Court.
In summary, this Court stated that BJ-Titan's case was
a "close decision."

The Court then listed specific factors which

militated both for and against taxation, and concluded that the
facts did not dictate a decision in favor of taxation, an analysis which was based upon a faulty legal prentise.

That the Com-

mission failed to apply the proper legal standard is clear from
the explicit language of the Commission's decision, and the decision itself, which found in favor of taxation when there was no

6

Instead, this Court deferred to the Commission's application
of the "essence of the transaction" test which concluded that
cementing services were, in essence, the sale of tangible personal property.
In support, the Court cited Haroldsen and
McKendrick, both of which are inapposite. McKendrick involved
the sale of an artificial limb and Haroldsen involved the sale of
computer software. In both cases, the sale of tangible property
concluded the transaction. Here, the essence of the transaction
was customized services at the job site, not cement in a hole.
Even under the "essence of the transaction" test, the Commission's decision is unreasonable because it imposes a 100% tax on
a transaction that is 70% service.
-11-

substantial or compelling evidence to do so.

Based on this, the

Court should reverse the Commission's decision.
IV.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Based on the foregoing, BJ-Titan respectfully requests
that the Court grant BJ-Titan's Petition for Rehearing.
seeks

to

have

this

matter

remanded

to

the

BJ-Titan

Commission

with

instructions as to the proper legal standard to be applied in
this case; i.e., that, in interpreting or construing the statute
to the applicable facts of this case, the relevant statute must
be construed

liberally in favor of the taxpayer and strictly

against the Commission.

Moreover, this Court should direct the

Commission to find substantial evidence in the record which compels a decision that BJ-Titan Services should be taxed.

Should

the Court desire oral argument or additional written briefs on
this issue, BJ-Titan would be pleased to provide the same.
V.

CERTIFICATION

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Petition
for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay.
DATED this /^

day of April, 1992.

MAXWELL A. MILLER
RANDY M. GRIMSHAW
RICHARD M. MARSH
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR
REHEARING to the following on this M'

day of April, 1992:

Brian Tarbet
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

~~)tAJm)j/fr
RMM/041092A
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APPENDIX "A"

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OOOoo
B.J.-Titan Services,
Petitioner,

No. 90i 368
F I L! D
March 1, 1992

State Tax Commission,
Respondent.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Original Proceeding in this Court
Attorneys:

STEWART,

R. Paul Van Dam, Brian Tarbet, Salt Lake City, for
State Tax Commission
Randy M. Grimshaw, Maxwell A. Milder, Richard M.
Marsh, Salt Lake City, for BJ-Titan

Justice:

BJ-Titan Services Company (MBJ-Titan*) seeks review of
the Utah State Tax Commission's ruling which imposed sales and
use taxes on BJ-Titan's oil and gas well stimulation services
and on a transfer of motor vehicles from BJ-Htighes Holding
Company ("BJ-Hughes") to BJ-Titan. We reverse in part and
remand.
FACTS
The basic facts are undisputed. The appeal before the
Commission involved two consolidated cases: ftuqhes Tool Co. v.
Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, Appeal
No. 88-1500, filed May 31, 1988, and BJ-Titan, Services Co. v.
Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, Appeal
No. 88-1644, filed June 24, 1988. The Auditipg Division of the
Utah State Tax Commission assessed additional! sales and use
taxes against Hughes Tool Company in the amouht of $239,842.89
for the period October 1, 1983, to March 31, 1985, and against
BJ-Titan Service Company in the amount of $116,574.11 for the
period April 1, 1985, to September 30, 1986. BJ-Titan appealed
the assessment to the Utah State Tax Commission.

In April 1985, Hughes Tool Company, through its
holding company, BJ-Hughes, and Titan Services, Incorporated
("Titan Services"), combined to form BJ-Titan, a general
partnership. BJ-Hughes contributed 12 percent of BJ-Titan1s
assets, and Titan Services contributed 28 percent.
Accordingly, BJ-Hughes received a 72 percent interest in the
partnership, and Titan Services received a 28 percent
interest. Assets contributed by BJ-Hughes included certain
motor vehicles, titled and registered in Texas. BJ-Titan did
not pay a sales and use tax on the vehicle transfers. The
Auditing Division included the sales and use tax on the
transfer in its assessment against BJ-Titan.
BJ-Titan provides oil and gas well stimulation and
stabilization services. The well stimulation services
generally consist of three different activities: cementing,
hydraulic fracturing, and acidizing. Cementing is the
placement of cement and other slurry compositions into various
places in the well. BJ-Titan uses a special grade of Portland
Cement in combination with any of 54 additives, depending on
well conditions. The most important part of cementing is the
injection of the cement slurry between the well hole and the
well casing. Once poured, the cement permanently affixes the
casing to the surrounding hole and cannot be removed. The
cementing process stabilizes the well and isolates producing
zones within the well. Hydraulic fracturing extends the bore
laterally by injecting fluids into the well. Acidizing is an
extension of hydraulic fracturing and uses hydrochloric acid in
combination with other agents to improve well flow capacity. A
substantial portion of BJ-Titan's audit deficiency relates to
cementing services.1
BJ-Titan delivers its products to the well site and
makes recommendations to the well operators regarding the
precise formulas to be used and the method of placement in the
well. Well operators decide whether to accept or reject the
recommendations. Contracts between BJ-Titan and operators
contain a specific provision which states that "work done by
BJ-Titan shall be under the direction, supervision and control
of the owner, operator, or his agent and BJ-Titan will perform
the work as an independent contractor and not as an employee or
agent of the owner or operator." BJ-Titan uses specialized
equipment and trained personnel in providing stimulation
services.
BJ-Titan bills customers for a lump sum and does not
separately itemize labor and materials. The price, however,
includes a charge for sales tax on the materials. BJ-Titan
then remits the collected tax to the State Tax Commission.
Based on the amount of tax remitted, the materials portion
1. According to BJ-Titan, cementing comprises 92 percent of
the services involved in the audit deficiencies.
No. 900368
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comprises on average about 30 percent of a tofcal contract
price. BJ-Titan does not pay sales tax on thp materials it
purchases•
The parties dispute exactly what BJ-Titan's customers
purchase. The Commission contends that BJ-Titan's customers
purchase the final product (the cement foundation and chemical
materials) in the hole where it has its only value and that the
product acquires value only after the materials and services
together have been provided. BJ-Titan asserts that its
customers actually purchase improved well perjformance, rather
than the materials used to achieve that resul|t.
COMMISSION'S RULINGS
The Commission affirmed the Audit Division's
assessment and denied BJ-Titan's petition. The Commission
found that BJ-Titan had failed to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that oil and gas stimulation services and the
transfer of motor vehicles from BJ-Hughes to pj-Titan were
exempt from sales and use tax. The Commissiojn first concluded
that "the portion of its product which BJ-Titl<:ian has labeled as
services is really charges 'for fabrication oji
>jr installation
which is part of the process of creating a fii
Jnished article of
tangible personal property' (the cement whicq is sold to the
well operators) . . . . H The Commission furtlher found, "Where
the Petitioner is in the business of oil and gas stimulation,
the Petitioner operates as a retailer of tanc^iible personal
property. The services that it provides to ts customers in
the sale of these products is a necessary component of the
final product." Second, the Commission concluded that BJ-Titan
was not a real property contractor within the meaning of the
administrative rules and, thus, was not exempt from sales and
use taxes. Third, the Commission concluded tjhat the transfer
of motor vehicles was subject to sales and us e taxes. Finally,
the Commission concluded that BJ-Titan faileq to establish that
the Commission had a formal policy of taxing motor vehicle
transfers on an aggregate basis, i.e., taxind the value at the
proportion of the noncontributing partner's Equity ownership in
the partnership.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The primary issues on appeal are wh ther the
Commission erred (1) in determining that BJ- itan operates as a
retailer of tangible personal property in pr viding cementing,
acidizing, and fracturing to its customers; 2) in concluding
that BJ-Titan was not a real property contra tor; (3) in
determining that the transfer of vehicles wa subject to sales
and use taxes; and (4) in rejecting BJ-Titan^s argument that
the Commission had an established policy of taxing motor
vehicle transfers on an aggregate basis.

3
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DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
As the proceedings in these petitions commenced after
January 1, 1988, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
("UAPA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to -22 (1989), governs
the standards of review. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-22
(1989); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1991); Savage Indus., Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 668-69 (Utah 1991).

well Stimulation Services
We first address whether the Commission erred in
determining that BJ-Titan operates as a retailer of tangible
personal property in providing cementing, acidizing, and
fracturing to its customers and, therefore, that sales and use
taxes should be imposed on all charges billed to its
customers. Because the tax was assessed for the years 1983 to
1986, statutes from those years are controlling.
Since the 1930s, Utah law has imposed a tax on retail
sales of tangible personal property. See Utah Code Ann.
#59-15-4(1) (Supp. 1986) (currently § 59-12-103(1)(a) (1987
& Supp. 1991)). The Code defines a retail sale as every sale
by a retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer and not for
resale. IdL § 59-15-2(4) , (5), (6), (7) (Supp. 1986)
(currently § 59-12-103(1)(a) (1987 & Supp. 1991)). However,
the Code exempts from tax sales of tangible personal property
to a manufacturer which becomes an ingredient or component part
of other tangible personal property. Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-15-2(7) (Supp. 1986) (currently § 59-12-104(27) (Supp.
1991)). Although the Legislature did not define the term
"tangible personal property" until 1991, the Commission's rules
in effect in 1986 defined it as "all tangible or corporeal
things and substances which are dealt in or capable of being
possessed or exchanged." Utah Admin. R. 865-26S (1986), 2
A review of our case law analyzing these provisions
reveals two emerging lines of theory. The first, known as the
essence of the transaction theory, focuses on the nature of
what was sold and whether it primarily entails tangible
personal property. See Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 805 P.2d 176 (Utah 1990); Snarr Advertising, Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 20 Utah 2d 55, 432 P.2d 882 (1967);
2. The current Code defines tangible personal property, inter
alia, as "all goods, wares, merchandise, produce, and
commodities [and] all tangible or corporeal things and
substances which are dealt in or capable of being possessed or
exchanged." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13)(a)(i-ii) (Supp.
1991) .
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McKendrick v. State Tax Comm'n, 9 Utah 2 d 418, 347 P.2d 177
(1959); Youno Electric Sign Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 4
Utah 2d 242, 291 P.2d 900 (1955); see al s£ lha rne and Wilson,
Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1237 (Utah 1984) . This
theory examines the transaction as a who le to determine whether
the essence of the transaction is one fo r services or for
tangible personal property. The analysi s typipally requires a
determination either that the services p rovide|3 are merely
incidental to an essentially personal pr operty transaction or
that the property provided is merely inc identa !l to an
essentially service transaction. Since the laW imposes a tax
only on the sale of tangible personal pr operty| transactions
that are essentially services are not ta xable
The second theory, known as the ultimjate user or
consumer theory, focuses on whether a retail sale is made to a
user or consumer and not for resale. See Tummurru Trades, Inc
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah l|990) Hardy v,
State Tax Comm'n, 561 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1977); Sjine v. State Tax
Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 214, 390 P.2d 130 (1964); Barrett Inv. Co.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P.2d 9H98 (1964); Ralph
Child Constr, Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 12 Utah! 2d 53, 362 P.2d"
422 (1961); Olson CQnStC COt v State Tax Conim'n, 12 Utah 2d
42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961); Nickerson Pump & Mac[h. Co. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 30, 361 P.2d 520 (1961) ; Union Portland
Cement Co. V, State Tax Comm'n/ n o Utah 135, 170 P.2d 164
(1946); £^£ Qlsen Co, v, State Ta? Comm'n, 109 Utah 563, 168
P.2d 324 (1946); Utah Concrete Prods. Corp. v State Tax
Comm'n, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942); Western Leather &
Finding Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 87 Utah 227, 48 P.2d 526
(1935). Unlike the essence of the transactiori theory, this
theory examines the nature, rather than the siibject, of the
transaction. The theory acknowledges that tangible personal
property is often used in the process of making other property
and in rendering services. The legal question posed is, who is
the ultimate "user or consumer" of the tangible personal
property? Transactions with the ultimate usetf or consumer are
subject to sales tax. This analysis is based on a presumed
legislative intent to tax the last possible ti ansacticn.
A synthesis of these two theories and the cases
decided under them reveals five distinguishable categories.
The first category addresses whether the transaction is
essentially a transfer of tangible personal property. These
cases involve an inseparable combination of tangible property
and services in developing the product and examine the essence
3. However, the Code specifically levies sales tax on certain
services: "all services for repairs, renovations, cleaning, or
washing of tangible personal property or for the installation
of tangible personal property rendered in connection with other
tangible personal property." Utah Code Ann. $ 59-15-4(1)(e)
(Supp. 1986) .
5
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of the transaction to determine whether the object of the
transfer is tangible property or services. For example, in the
repair of electric signs, the essence of the transaction is
services, even though a part of the transaction includes a
transfer of tangible personal property, such as wires, clips,
and lights. S££ Young Electric Sign Co. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 4 Utah 2d 242, 291 P.2d 900 (1955). Similarly, the
sale of custom-made advertising displayed on road signs owned
by the seller is in essence a transaction for services, even
though the sign itself is individually constructed for each
sale. See Snarr Advertising, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 20
Utah 2d 55, 432 P.2d 882 (1967). In contrast, the sale of
artificial limbs essentially entails a transaction for tangible
personal property, even though part of the transaction includes
fitting the limb and training the user. See McKendrick v.
State Tax Comm'n, 9 Utah 2d 418, 347 P.2d 177 (1959). Also,
the sale of customer lists on printed sheets and magnetic tapes
is in essence a transfer of tangible personal property, even
though the seller helps select and modify the lists. See Mark
O. Haroldsen, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 805 P.2d 176 (Utah
1990) •
In analyzing cases in the first category, this Court
has relied on several factors for determining whether the
object of the transaction constitutes tangible personal
property or services. These factors include (1) the value of
the tangible property to the customer in relation to that of
the services; (2) the cost of the property to the seller;
(3) the customer's rights to possession or ownership of the
property; (4) the ability to separately itemize charges for the
property and services; (5) the extent to which the services
increase the value of the property or to which the property
increases the value of the services; and (6) the extent that
such services are rendered in similar transactions. In these
cases, we generally defer to the Commission's application of
these factors and its determination of what constitutes the
essence of a transaction. Accordingly, the Court will not
overturn that determination unless it is unreasonable or
arbitrary. See Mark O. Haroldsen, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n,

805 P.2d 176, 181 (Utah 1990); see also McKendrick v. State Tax
Comm'n, 9 Utah 2d 418, 347 P.2d 1~7, 178 (1959;.
Cases falling within the other four categories stress
the general question of who the user or consumer of tangible
personal property is. These cases differ from the first
category in that they involve transactions which include
severable services and property portions. As noted above, the
Code taxes only sales to users or consumers not for resale.
Also, the Code specifically exempts sales of ingredients and
component parts used in manufacturing.
If these categories were placed upon a taxation
continuum or spectrum, the manufacturing category would be
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found at one extreme, where purchases are clea [rly not taxable
Manufacturers are not deemed consumers of tang ible property
which is transformed into their final products [. For example,
corporation that assembles large water pumps f |rom component
parts is not a user or consumer of those parts;; rather, the
corporation's customers are. £££ Nickerson Pufoo & Mach. Co. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 30, 361 P.2d 520 (1961). The
parts fit into the exemption for ingredients a nd component
parts of manufactured products. The final product becomes
tangible personal property which is more valua |ble than the sum
of the components. Furthermore, assembly does not alter the
identities of the parts.
An exception exists, however, for p ro|perty and
t
equipmen used up in the manufacturing processj. For example, a
corporat ion that uses firebrick, iron grindi ng| balls, and coal
in manuf acturing cement is the consumer of t hese items, even
though p articles of each incidentally become dart of the
cement. £33. Union Portland Cement Co, v, St ate Tax Comm'n, 110
Utah 135 , 170 P.2d 164 (1946). Similarly, a corporation that
uses ins ecticides and boxes in preparing and delivering produce
is the c onsumer of these items. See E.C. 01 sdn COt v. State
In, 109 Utah 563, 168 P.2d 324 (1946 ) .1 Such materials
are cons umed during the manufacturing proces s land are not
intended to become ingredients or component parts of the
finished product.
Near the manufacturing extreme is th£ auto repair
category, where purchases are not taxable. Here, the customer,
not the repairer, is the ultimate consumer ofjauto parts
because the parts are installed without alteration and can be
easily separated from the labor performed in installing them.
A similar example is shoe repair where the customer, not the
repairer, is the consumer of leather used in a repair job. See

western leather fr Finding COt v, State Ta* Corjim'n, 87 Utah 227,
48 P.2d 526 (1935).
The professional services category f^lls in the middle
of the spectrum, where some purchases are taxible while others
are not. Here, tangible personal property used in providing
professional services is consumed by the provider rather than
the client. For example, a dentist is the cohsumer of
materials used in his or her practice, such a^ plastics,
cements, and metals, even though the patient lis the end
recipient of the property. See Hardy v. Statft Tax Comm'n, 561
P.2d 1064 (Utah 1977). To the extent that su :h materials
cannot practically be itemized for individual! patients,
dentists are the last persons in the property chain who can be
taxed. Similarly, a motel owner is the consumer of towels,
blankets, soap, and other property used in the rental of rooms,
even though the customer is the recipient of their use. See
Sine v. State Tax Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 214, 390|P.2d 130 (1964).
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Contractors make up the final category and the other
extreme of the spectrum. Here, purchases clearly are taxable.
Although analytically similar to other labor-intensive
businesses such as dentistry, the Court has developed a
different rationale for resolving the issue of taxability for
contractors. Contractors are deemed consumers of building
materials used in the construction of buildings and other
facilities. For example, contractors are consumers of concrete
pipe, cinder blocks, and related concrete products used in the
construction of highways and buildings, Utah Concrete Prods.
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942),
steel building materials used in the construction of buildings,
Olson Constr. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d
1112 (1961), modular building units used in the construction of
buildings out of the state, Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990), and telephone poles used
in the construction of telephone systems; Ralph Child Constr.
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 53, 362 P.2d 422 (1961).
Contractors are the last persons in the property chain to deal
with the products before incorporation into a separate entity
and before the products lose their identity as building
materials. Also, they purchase the materials not to resell
them in their original form, but for the purpose of changing
their nature from personal to real property. For this reason,
the exemption for ingredients or component parts of tangible
personal property does not apply to contractors. Barrett Inv.
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P.2d 998, 1000
(1964) . 4
In the instant case, the Commission taxed BJ-Titan's
services because it found the services to be "a necessary
component of the final product." The Commission stated, "The
customer is purchasing the final product in the hole where it
has its only value to the customer. The final product has
value to the customers of BJ-Titan only after the materials and
services together have been provided." With respect to
cementing, the Commission found that "BJ-Titan synthesizes
materials and services to provide a finished product which
stabilizes the pipe located in the well." With respect to
fracturing, acidizing, and nitrogen work,5 the Commission
found:
4. The current code expressly removes real property from the
definition of tangible personal property. Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-12-102(13)(b)(i) (Supp. 1991).
5. Although the Commission included "nitrogen work" in this
finding, the parties have not discussed this service in any
detail. Trade materials submitted in the record indicate that
nitrogen is used to extend fracturing and acidizing and as an
ingredient in cementing. We assume that in using "nitrogen
work," the Commission meant nitrogen services as similar to
fracturing and acidizing. We therefore treat it as such.
No. 900368
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In each of these services the personal
property used in stimulation becomes part
of the production of the well and is
returned when oil and other fluids arte
taken from the well. In these cases,
BJ-Titan has sold the products to the final
consumer, and sales tax should have b^en
collected on that sale to the final
consumer.
BJ-Titan argues that the Commission's! findings are
erroneous because the services BJ-Titan provides are
substantial and not incidental to the sale of tangible personal
property. Section 59-15-4(1) implicitly grant|s the Commission
some discretion in determining whether a certa|in transaction
constitutes a sale of "tangible personal property." See Morton
Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Taj Comm'n, 814 P.2d
581, 588 (Utah 1991). Thus, in accordance wit^h UAPA and our
previous cases on this issue, we will not ups^t the
Commission's determination that the essence of| a transaction is
tangible personal property unless it is unreasonable or
arbitrary. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (h) (il), (iv) (1989);
Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 805 P.2d 176, 181
(Utah 1990); McKendrick v. State Tax Comm'n. i Utah 2d 418, 347
P.2d 177, 178 (1959) .
With respect to the cementing services, the Commission
could reasonably conclude that well operators intend to
purchase the concrete in the well hole and th^t the services
provided by BJ-Titan, such as developing the proper mixture of
concrete slurry and injecting the mixture into the well, are
incidental to that final product. Applicatior| of the factors
used in determining whether tangible personal property is the
essence of a transaction to this case results in the following
relevant facts on both sides of the issue: The value to the
customer lies in the combination of materials and services,
neither having much value without the other; the materials
comprise on average 30 percent of the charge ^o a customer;
well operators acquire possession, if not ownership, of the
cement; BJ-Titan apparently has the ability t$ charge
separately for the materials and the services; although it has
not done so in practice; and such materials ajpe not typically
sold without the services.
We cannot say that these facts compel, a conclusion
that the cementing services rendered in this <j:ase are
incidental to the product delivered. In a cl^se decision such
as this, we defer to the Commission's judgmenj:. The Commission
is in a better position to weigh the evidence and to assess an
individual case in light of the many determinations that the
Commission makes on close but different factual situations.6
6.We

note that the cement used by BJ-Titan ^alls within the
(continued on p. 10)
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With respect to the hydraulic fracturing and acidizing
services, however, we hold that the Commission's determination
that a well operator purchases in essence tangible personal
property is unreasonable. Unlike cementing, fracturing and
acidizing produce no finished tangible product. Chemicals are
injected into the well to stimulate well flow and returned as
part of production when oil and other fluids are taken from the
well. The well operator is not concerned with retrieving the
chemicals, or the use of any particular chemical. The value to
the customer lies purely in the service, not in the chemicals,
and there is no real transfer of possession or ownership of the
chemicals. Therefore, the essence of BJ-Titan's fracturing and
acidizing services is providing services, not tangible personal
property, and the chemicals consumed in providing those
services are merely incidental and thus not taxable. Because
the Commission did not determine what proportion of the tax
deficiencies relate to cementing and what proportion relate to
fracturing and acidizing, we remand for that determination.
We next address whether the Commission erred in
determining that BJ-Titan is not a real property contractor.
BJ-Titan argues that it converts tangible personal property,
cement, into real property, and therefore, it is a real
property contractor and should have paid sales tax on its
purchases of the materials used to produce the cement. As
noted above, BJ-Titan billed its customers for a lump sum,
without itemizing labor and materials. Each price, however,
included a charge for sales tax on the materials used.
BJ-Titan did not pay sales tax on the purchases of the raw
materials. The Commission concluded that these practices,
"were not those of a real property contractor but were those of
a retail sales business which purchased the materials for later
resale."
The different treatment applied to real property
contractors is based on the proposition that building materials
lose their identity as such when they become part of a building
or facility. In other words, they are converted from tangible
personal property into real property. The issue is not, as
BJ-Titan urges, which party to the transaction converted the
cement into real property, but rather, who the ultimate user or
consumer of the cement is. Because the essence of the
transaction between BJ-Titan and a well operator is tangible
personal property, BJ-Titan purchased the raw materials used in
producing its cement not for consumption, but for resale, and
the labor expended in producing the final product merely
increased the sales value of that product. The ultimate
(footnote 6 continued)
Commission's definition of "tangible personal property," i^j
"all tangible or corporeal things and substances which are
dealt in or capable of being possessed or exchanged." Utah
Admin. R. 865-26S (1986).
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consumer is the well operator. In this respect, BJ-Titan is
like a concrete mixing company hired to arrive) at a site and
pour concrete into a hole dug by and between fiorms erected by
the general contractor, who is the consumer of' the cement. The
contractor purchases delivered and poured concrete and leaves
the formulation of the blend of ingredients to the concrete
provider, as conditions require. The labor ex|pended in
producing and pouring the concrete and the cos|t of delivery are
all included in the price.
Moreover, a well operator is in the business of making
wells produce. The well operator contracts with BJ-Titan to
obtain a concrete anchor around the well casing which
stabilizes the well and isolates zones of production identified
by the operator. The operator provides BJ-Titjan with all the
necessary well data and runs the cementing equipment down the
bore. In essence, the well operator purchases a certain amount
of cement at a certain location in the well. It does not seek
to purchase real property, nor does the cement become
inseparably meshed into a greater facility whiich itself is the
object of the transaction. From the standpoint of the well
operator, who may or may not own the well, th^ cement has not
lost its identity as tangible personal property.
Vehicle Transfer
Finally, we address whether the Commission erred in
holding that the transfer of vehicles from BJ+Hughes to
BJ-Titan was subject to sales tax.
BJ-Titan is a Texas general partnership established in
1985 by BJ-Hughes Holding Company and Titan Services
Incorporated. In forming BJ-Titan, BJ-Hughesicontributed
72 percent of the assets and Titan Services contributed
28 percent. Among the assets transferred by pj-Hughes were
motor vehicles titled and registered in Texas^ The Commission
found that this transfer was properly taxed. We affirm.
The Sales Tax Act levies a tax on ev0ry retail sale of
tangible personal property made within the state. Utah Code
Ann. § 59-15-4(1)(a) (Supp. 1986). The term ^retail sale"
means every sale within the state of Utah by a retailer or
wholesaler to a user or consumer, unless otherwise exempted.
Id. § 59-15-2(6). Expressly excluded from th^ definition of a
retail sale are Hisolated [and] occasional sales by persons not
regularly engaged in business." IJ&. However, a sale of a
vehicle Hof a type required to be registered under the
provisions of the motor vehicle laws of this state" is not an
isolated or occasional sale, unless it is a transfer "in a
business reorganization where the ownership of the transferee
organization is substantially the same as to |the ownership of
the transferor organization." Id.
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BJ-Titan first argues that its vehicles are not "of a
type required to be registered," citing an exception to
registration for interstate commercial vehicles duly registered
in another state and not owned by a state resident. Because
this issue was not raised before the Commission, we decline to
address it.
BJ-Titan next argues that the transfer of motor
vehicles is exempt from sales tax because the transfer occurred
in a business reorganization where the ownership of the
transferee organization is substantially the same as the
transferor organization. To be excepted from sales tax under
§ 59-15-2(6), there must first be a "business reorganization"
and second the ownership of the transferee must be
"substantially the same" as the ownership of the transferor.
The Act does not define either "business reorganization" or
"substantially the same."
The Commission concluded that the transfer of assets
from two business entities to form and organize a new legal
entity is not a business reorganization. Rather, the two
original entities have formed a new and separate entity. The
Commission also concluded that the ownership of BJ-Titan, the
transferee, is not substantially the same as the ownership of
BJ-Hughes, the transferor, because BJ-Hughes held less than an
80 percent interest in BJ-Titan. The 80 percent figure
represents an informal policy of the Auditing Division based on
the Internal Revenue Code. Because this is primarily a
question of statutory interpretation, we will grant relief only
if the Commission has erroneously interpreted the law. See
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989).
The general rule on reorganizations is as follows:
A reorganization . . . is not ordinarily the
combination of several existing
corporations, but is simply the carrying out
by proper agreements and legal proceedings
of a business plan or scheme for winding up
the affairs of, or foreclosing a mortgage or
mortgages upon, the property of insolvent
corporations, and the organization of a new
corporation to take over the property and
business of the distressed corporation.
19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2514 (1986). Clearly, under
this rule, a transfer of assets by two separate entities to
create a partnership, a new legal entity, is not a "business
reorganization." However, even assuming that a reorganization
includes the transfer of assets by one corporation to another
entity, the ownership of the transferee and transferor in this
case is not substantially the same.
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The chapter on franchise and privilege taxes in the
1986 Code defined wreorganization" for the purposes of
§§ 59-13-13 and 59-13-14 to include "[a] transfer by a
corporation of all or a part of its assets to another
corporation, if immediately after the transfer! the transferor
or its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation
to which the assets are transferred . . . ." lutah Code Ann.
§ 53-13-12(9)(a) (Supp. 1986). The Code definbd the term
"control" as "the ownership of at least eighty per cent of the
voting stock and at least eighty per cent of the total number
of shares of all other classes of stock of thq corporation."
Id. § 53-13-12(10) .
In the instant case, BJ-Hughes received a 72 percent
interest in BJ-Titan. We believe the 80 percent requirement
adopted by the Commission is reasonable in li^ht of the
definition in the franchise and privilege taxqs chapter of the
Utah Code.
BJ-Titan also argues for the first time on appeal that
the transfer was not a "sale," because BJ-Hugfyes owned the same
assets before and after the transfer and, thu^, there has been
no consideration for a sale to have taken placje. Because the
issue was not raised before the Commission, w^ decline to
address it.7
7. BJ-Titan relies on three cases: Northern Telecom, Inc.
Olsen, 679 S W.2d 448 (Tenn. 1984); IBEC Indus., Inc. v.
LiMXey, 405 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio 1980) (per curiam); Roberts &
Sons, Inc. v Kosvdar. 330 N.E.2d 437 (Ohio 1^75) (per
curiam). In Northern Telecom, a subsidiary corporation was
absorbed into the parent corporation and registration of an
aircraft owned by the subsidiary was transferred to the
parent. The court held that no sale for consideration occurred
and that the transfer of title was not subject to sales tax:
The record discloses that as a Result
of the transaction Northern Telecom, Inc.'s
position was not changed; it continued to
have complete control over the same issets;
it gave up nothing, no money or othet
consideration was exchanged. Nothing was
effected other than an internal corporate
reorganization. The subsidiary received
nothing for its transfer of assets to the
parent; indeed, following the transaction
there was no subsidiary to receive a
consideration.
Northern Telecom, 679 S.W.2d at 449.
In IBEC, the court held that a transfer of vehicles from a
corporation to a new wholly owned subsidiary was not a sale for
sales tax purposes because it lacked consideration. The court
reasoned that there was "merely a shifting of'assets by a
(continued on p. 14)
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Finally, BJ-Titan asserts that the Commission had a
policy of taxing motor vehicle transfers on an aggregate basis
and that the Commission erred in allowing the Auditing Division
to deviate from that policy. The "aggregate" rule assesses
sales tax on the value of assets transferred to a partnership
based on the non-contributing partner's equity ownership in the
partnership. By contrast, the "entity" rule, used by the
Auditing Division, assesses the tax at the whole value of the
transfer.
Under UAPA, we will grant relief where an agency
action is "contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons
that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(h)(iii) (1989).
To be entitled to relief, however, a party must show that the
agency's prior practice is firmly established. See Morton, 814
P.2d at 595, The Commission found that the evidence presented
by BJ-Titan, the opinion testimony of a single witness, was
insufficient to establish that the Auditing Division followed
an aggregate policy. BJ-Titan argues that the Commission
"cavalierly ignored" a memorandum written by the witness while
she was still an employee with the Commission and an informal
opinion from the Attorney General's office. We have reviewed
this evidence and the record and affirm as reasonable the
Commission's finding that the aggregate rule was not a formal
policy.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Commission's ruling that the cementing
services provided by BJ-Titan are subject to sales and use
taxes. We reverse the Commission's ruling that the fracturing
(footnote 7 continued)
corporation from one division to another." IBEC, 405 N.E.2d at
290. In Roberts & Sons, a partnership transferred all its
assets to a newly formed corporation. In the transaction,
certain vehicles were issued new titles and registrations. The
court held that no sale of the vehicles had occurred for
purposes of sales tax because "[t]here is nothing in the record
in this case to indicate that there was any 'consideration' or
'price' paid for the vehicles." Roberts & Sons, 330 N.E.2d at
438. However, for a transfer similar to that in IBEC in which
the court held that consideration was present, see Hawthorn
Mellodv, Inc. v. Lindley, 417 N.E.2d 1257, 1262-63 (Ohio 1981).
These cases necessarily turn on a question of fact: Was
there consideration for the transfer of assets? To make this
determination, the terms and circumstances of the transactions
must be examined. Because this argument was not presented to
the Commission below, a finding of fact on consideration has
not been made, and we will not indulge in such evidentiary
endeavors .
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and acidizing services provided by BJ-Titan are taxable and
remand for a division of deficiencies attributable to
cementing, fracturing, and acidizing. We affirm the
Commission's ruling that the transfer of motor vehicles from
BJ-Hughes to BJ-Titan was subject to sales and use taxes.
Reversed in part and remanded,
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